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RETAIL DELIVERY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
AFTER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT:
HOW WILL PUBLIC POLICY
SHAPE THE "FINANCIAL SERVICES
SUPERMARKET"?
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment by Congress of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("Gramm-LeachBliley") was the culmination of years of legisla-
tive and regulatory action regarding the shape of the financial
services industry in the United States. The adoption of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley was intended, among other things, "to enhance
competition in the financial services industry by providing a
prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other financial services providers."'
This legislative goal is sought to be achieved by breaking
down regulatory barriers to the entry by banking, insurance and
securities firms into other financial services businesses, either
through mergers and acquisitions or de novo, by removing arbi-
trary restrictions on such activities, and by establishing a frame-
work for coordinated regulation of such activities among various
regulatory agencies. Gramm-Leach-Bliley frees national banks
from the prior federal restrictions on the conduct of the business
of insurance and all banks from potential discriminatory conduct
t General Counsel, Centura Banks, Inc., Rocky Mount, North Carolina; A.B.,
1971, Davidson College; J.D., 1974, University of Virginia. The views expressed in
this article are the author's own and are not necessarily those of Centura Banks, Inc.
1. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Conference
Report in Respect of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, at 151.
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by state regulators in regulating the business of insurance.2 Fur-
ther, to the extent that banks were subject to any meaningful
regulatory restrictions on the securities activities, such restric-
tions are gone as well. In the retail financial services market, the
powers available to traditional banks are broad and relatively
unfettered.
Among the perceived benefits of Gramm-Leach-Bliley is a
clearing away of regulatory obstacles that will allow banks, in-
surance companies and securities firms to create "financial ser-
vices supermarkets," offering to customers in one place a wide
array of financial products and services rather than the relatively
limited offerings allowed under prior law.3 This article will offer
a preliminary view of the impact of Gramm-Leach-Bliley on the
organization and operation of the financial services supermarket
and on the delivery of products and services to retail customers,
by which I mean individuals and small businesses. It will argue
that Gramm-Leach-Bliley has created an environment that can
result in great benefit to the retail customer, so long as the im-
plementation of policy designed to protect consumers does not
inhibit financial services companies from effectively offering ser-
vices to this market.
H. BACKGROUND AND ANALYTIC Focus
Gramm-Leach-Bliley affects the banking, insurance and
securities industries and, accordingly, can profitably be discussed
2. As an officer of an institution not subject to the restrictions of the National
Bank Act on insurance sales and a resident of a state characterized by numerous
areas having less than 5,000 people, I would like to express a fond and wistful
farewell to the limitations formerly faced by national banks in the sale of insurance.
They will be missed.
3. The author realizes that defining the locus of an activity as a "place" in the
age of the Internet places him dangerously close to dinosaur status; however, the
analysis that follows will generally refer to the traditional delivery channels be-
cause (i) such channels continue to account for the vast majority of retail transac-
tions and (ii) the regulatory regimes governing the financial services supermarket
will have to govern both traditional and non-traditional channels. In addition, ref-
erences to securities and insurance activities of banks in this article will be to bro-
kerage, rather than underwriting activity.
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from the perspective of each industry. In order to tax neither the
reader's patience nor the author's knowledge, this article will
proceed from the perspective of banking, which is, in itself, im-
possible to define in any general manner. The industry com-
prises a wide variety of companies, organized in a variety of
corporate forms, conducting a variety of businesses and regu-
lated by a variety of federal and state agencies. That having been
said, traditional banking institutions are all confronted with a
radically changing marketplace that is being driven by revolu-
tionary developments in information processing and communi-
cations technology and by deregulation. Gramm-Leach-Bliley is
only the latest portal of entry into the business of banking by
non-bank competitors. As Fed Governor Meyer noted in an ad-
dress following the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley: "The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act will likely accelerate certain trends al-
ready underway in the financial services industry, resulting in
further consolidation of the industry and a wider range of finan-
cial activities within many banking organizations." 4
As suggested above, I cannot comment on how "the in-
dustry" will respond to these developments, because there is not
one response. I will discuss my company's response and will use
that example to assess certain legal and regulatory challenges
confronting both traditional and non-traditional competitors in
marketing retail financial services under Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
First a few words about my company. Centura Banks, Inc.
is a North Carolina bank holding company whose primary sub-
sidiary is Centura Bank, a North Carolina Federal Reserve mem-
ber bank. Centura Bank offers personal and business banking
services through a network of traditional branches (which we call
stores), in-store facilities in grocery stores, ATMs, a telephone
banking operation and over the Internet. Because of the relatively
liberal regulatory atmosphere in North Carolina, Centura has
conducted retail securities brokerage and retail and commercial
4. See Laurence H. Meyer, Remarks by Governor Laurence H. Meyer before the
Symposium on Financial Modernization Legislation, sponsored by Women in Housing and
Finance, Washington, D.C. (December 15, 1999) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/
boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991215.htm>.
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insurance brokerage activities through bank subsidiaries for a
number of years. Centura also has an active investment man-
agement program, including both trust investment and invest-
ment advisory activities for three equity mutual funds and two
bond funds marketed under the Centura name. In sum, Centura
seeks to be a full-service provider of financial services to the re-
tail market.
Like most other traditional banking firms, Centura is aware
of incursions into the business of banking by non-traditional
competitors that have occurred since the beginning of the
deregulation process in the 1970's and the shrinking share of wal-
lets for banks as a result. Frankly, you would have had to be
asleep and brain dead not to have observed the impact on the
banking industry of money market funds, asset management ac-
counts, discount securities brokers, captive financial operations
of commercial firms and the trust operations of securities and in-
surance firms, to name only the most obvious of these incursions.
Clearly, traditional banking institutions have to respond to these
developments if they are to compete effectively and survive.
Centura's response has been to reinvent itself as a retailer
of financial services rather than a bank. It has invested a signifi-
cant sum of money in developing a customer information system
that allows us to analyze customer profitability and the patterns
of conduct that lead to such profitability (or lack of it). It has in-
stituted a sales culture that provides significant financial incen-
tives to our customer contact people to learn as much as possible
about customers and to broaden and deepen customer relation-
ships by selling such customers as many products as possible,
either directly or through referral to licensed brokers of insurance
or securities. Unlike some of our competitors, Centura views the
various methods of customer contact (traditional stores, in-store
locations, ATMs, telephone, Internet) as distribution channels in
one retail distribution system, not as separate businesses. In con-
sumer and business lending Centura is an originator of loans;
however, in the securities and insurance businesses, it is a dis-
tributor of the products of other companies and of "house brand"
mutual funds. In its capacity as a distributor, Centura has close
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and continuing relations with a number of mutual fund families
and insurance companies, many of which are also its competi-
tors. The operating strategy that Centura has established is not
friction-free and is a work in progress; however, its management
and board are satisfied that it gives the company a reasonably
good chance of survival in the markets we serve. In addition, the
Centura operating strategy serves as a proxy for thinking in the
traditional banking industry about how banks can compete effec-
tively with both traditional and non-traditional competitors.
Whether the path that Centura has chosen is right or
wrong, Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the issues that have been
raised in connection with its enactment have changed the land-
scape for us and our competitors in ways that are not yet totally
certain. In the next section of this article, I will discuss a number
of issues that I believe are important to all competitors in the fi-
nancial services marketplace as we begin to operate in this new
environment.
III. THE ImPACT OF GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY
A. Regulatory Arbitrage
As noted above, Gramm-Leach-Bliley has altered and gen-
erally extended the powers of financial services firms. To bank-
ing industry competitors, this development raises issues
regarding their forms and domiciles of organization. In analyz-
ing a recent thrift acquisition, the chief financial officer of my
company pointed out that thrift customers were thrift customers
for a reason; as he put it, "They didn't just get lost trying to find a
bank." In similar fashion, banking organizations have chosen a
form of organization and domicile because it has suited the de-
velopment of the firm over time and has conferred some per-
ceived advantage in conducting the firm's businesses. For
example, North Carolina state chartered banks have maintained
that domicile and organization because of the perceived advan-
tages of state-wide branching and a progressive regulatory envi-
ronment, the benefits of which outweighed the burdens of
2000]
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relatively restrictive consumer protection laws. A number of
other firms have chosen to organize as national banks or federal
thrifts because of the benefits of preemption and (at least in the
case of thrifts) relatively broad powers, again outweighing the
applicable regulatory burdens. Restrictions on branching have
been gone for several years as a result of the Riegle-Neal Act.5 If
and to the extent Gramm-Leach-Bliley has really "leveled the
playing field" in terms of powers, each traditional competitor
ought to review its particular circumstances to see whether and
how any advantage is maintained from its current form of or-
ganization and domicile, and, more importantly, whether it is
disadvantaged by the status quo. Firms with multiple forms of
organization and domicile under a holding company will need to
assess each of the subsidiary organizations to see if the perceived
advantages of such organization remain, or whether organiza-
tional simplification is now in order.
Whatever the impact of Gramm-Leach-Bliley on the deci-
sions of traditional banking institutions regarding organization
and domicile, it is interesting to note how the legislation has re-
invented the holding company form of organization by making it
the centerpiece of expanded powers for banks and non-
traditional entrants into the business of banking. This is some-
thing of a change from the holding company's original function,
which was to facilitate geographic expansion for banking organi-
zations that were otherwise subject to legal restrictions on
branching. The holding company structure is, of course, the Fed-
eral Reserve's organizational form of choice for the exercise of
expanded bank powers conferred by Gramm- Leach-Bliley. Use
of the holding company structure is intended to prevent the ill
consequences of moral hazard to financial institutions resulting
from the mixing of non-traditional banking businesses with in-
sured bank deposits. To enter the brave new world of such non-
traditional businesses as merchant banking6 and securities and
5. It is interesting to note that neither Senator Riegle nor Representative Neal
is now in Congress. One wonders whether Gramm, Leach and Bliley took this into
consideration when S. 900 was named for them.
6. Merchant banking is the investment of banks in non-financial firms. See
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insurance underwriting, traditional banking institutions have to
adopt the financial holding company form of organization.7
On the other hand, Granm-Leach-Bliley confers fairly
broad powers on bank subsidiaries with regard to more tradi-
tional "financial" activities8 and, as noted above, branching re-
strictions have been pretty well decimated over time. Given
these circumstances, it will be interesting to see if any brave souls
buck the conventional wisdom by dropping the holding com-
pany form of organization altogether and operating as a bank
only. Those who followed the debate over Gramm-Leach-Bliley
will recall that Treasury supported a result something like this in
the debate over the organizational structure through which banks
were to exercise their expanded powers. Following the trend of
interpretive decisions of the Comptroller of the Currency that
substantially liberalized bank powers, Treasury argued that such
powers ought to be exercised through bank subsidiaries. While
this format will not suit those institutions that want to conduct
merchant banking, insurance and securities underwriting, and
other "new businesses," it could suit an organization that con-
ducts "plain vanilla" financial services businesses such as tradi-
tional banking and insurance and securities brokerage. Such a
mode of operation could actually reduce regulatory burden.
Don't hold your breath.
A related policy issue, and one of some concern to tradi-
tional banking institutions, is that the "leveling of the playing
field" will deny us the benefits obtained over the years of the so-
called dual banking system, that is to say the availability to banks
of the options of organizing under state or federal law. As noted
above, the system was and is a multiple banking system, involv-
ing multiple federal and state regulators, but the point remains
the same. Multiple regulators gave financial institutions choices
with regard to the regulatory regimes under which they were to
conduct their businesses. More importantly, and particularly in
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 103(k)(4)(H)-I), 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338,1344.
7. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103.
8. See id. § 121.
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light of the trend toward consolidation, it gave progressive regu-
lators an excuse to be creative and supportive of change and ex-
panded powers. This was particularly so in a number of states
such as North Carolina and, more recently, under the regime of
progressive Comptrollers of the Currency. While some might
deride this process as a race to the bottom, the reality was that it
was a race to the future and the smart regulators won. Given the
enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, it will be interesting to see
whether the benefits of multiple regulators will continue or
whether a uniform package of powers and restrictions applicable
to all institutions regardless of form of organization or domicile
will evolve. Assuming that the package is a liberal one, regula-
tory uniformity may not be a bad thing. 9
B. Regulatory Friction
Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley there will be functional regu-
lation of the various financial businesses conducted by financial
holding companies and banks. The implementation of this regu-
latory regime will have a profound impact on the delivery of re-
tail financial services and on whether consumers receive the
potential benefit of competition among financial services firms
that the legislation contemplates.
As noted above, the purpose of Gramm-Leach-Bliley is to
increase competition in the financial services industry. From the
point of view of many, if not most traditional banking institu-
tions, the operating model employed to compete in the new envi-
ronment is based on broadening and deepening customer
relationships ("cross-selling" to the cognoscenti). Generally, the
bank competitive model is based on the idea that the customer is
first dealt with by a customer service employee, a bank employee
9. An interesting early return on the multiple jurisdiction issue may be the
Comptroller's recent decision to allow National Commerce Bank to underwrite
corporate debt through a bank subsidiary. I am told by National Commerce's gen-
eral counsel that there were only a few letters of comment on the application for
permission to do so, among which was one from the Federal Reserve opposing this
expansion of bank powers.
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who is trained to assess the customer's overall needs for various
financial services, through the generation of a financial profile if
possible. This bank generalist then seeks to meet the financial
needs revealed by his or her work with the customer. If the cus-
tomer needs traditional bank products or services, the generalist
can provide them directly. If the customer needs specialized
bank services, insurance or securities, the generalist seeks to refer
the customer to a specialist or licensed broker.
The referral process is dictated both by the competitive
requirement that customers receive service from personnel com-
petent to render it and, in the case of insurance and securities,
from the requirements of law.10 Human nature being what it is, a
key to success under this model is providing the financial incen-
tive to bank generalists necessary to cause them to refer to li-
censed securities and insurance brokers where such referral is
appropriate. Absent such incentives, the generalists will sell the
customer what they can, traditional bank products, and, as a re-
sult, the perceived benefits of the financial services supermarket
(variety of products and services in one place) will be reduced or
lost.
Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, a number of institutions
such as Centura have operated under a customer service model
similar to the one described above, with customer service gener-
alists compensated in a unified compensation both for direct
sales to customers and for referrals to specialists, including in-
surance and securities brokers. With regard to securities sales,
banks (and, derivatively, their employees) were exempt from reg-
istration under the Exchange Act by section 3(a)(4) of that statute.
The conduct of bank employees with regard to the sale of insur-
ance and securities was governed by the Interagency Statement
10. It should be noted that Gramm-Leach-Bliley also amends the definition of
"broker" and "investment advisor" such that activities previously conducted as
exempt activities under Exchange Act or Investment Advisors Act may now be
subject to such acts and the SEC jurisdiction that comes with it. See Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act §§201, 215-219. Accordingly, the analysis of referral regulation set forth
with regard to securities may also apply to such activities to the extent they are no
longer exempt.
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on Sales of Non-depository Products (the "Interagency State-
ment"), section 5 of which provides that: "Depository institution
employees, including tellers, may receive a one-time nominal fee of
a fixed dollar amount for each customer referral for non-deposit
investment products. The payment of this referral fee should not de-
pend on whether the referral results in a transaction."1 Conduct by
registered securities brokers on the bank premises was governed
by NASD Rule 2350, which incorporated applicable provisions of
the Interagency Statement. The sale of insurance products was
governed by the Interagency Statement and applicable state law,
which (at least in Centura's experience) contained provisions re-
stricting referral fees to persons not licensed to conduct insurance
business in the state. 12
While the details of the manner and methods of calcula-
tion of compensation to bank employees for insurance and secu-
rities referrals vary between firms, in general they conform to
applicable public policy because they: (i) were incorporated into
an overall compensation system, (ii) were not exclusively tar-
geted to the sale of securities or insurance products, and (iii) were
based on referrals only and not on completed sales. Referral pro-
grams of the kind now in use have been conducted for a number
of years under the scrutiny of the applicable regulatory authori-
ties under the regulatory regime described above and have satis-
factorily addressed the investor protection concerns that should
be addressed by public policy.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley changes the regulatory regime dis-
cussed above with regard to securities sales by amending section
3(a)(4) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to remove the
statutory exemption of banks from "broker" status, except for a
11. See Interagency Statement on Sales of Non-depository Products, § 5 (em-
phasis added).
12. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-33-250) (1999) (providing that, "[n]o insurer,
agent, broker, or limited representative shall pay, directly or indirectly, any com-
mission, brokerage or other valuable consideration to any person for services as an
agent, broker or limited representative within this State, unless such person at the
time such services were performed held a valid license for that kind of insurance
and appropriate company appointments as required by this Article for such ser-
vices").
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series of defined exempted activities. 13 The exemptions applica-
ble to a discussion of cross-selling are contained in new section
3(a)(4)(B)(4)(i), which contains nine paragraphs defining the
permissible securities activities by bank personnel not subject to
the securities laws.14  Of particular interest are paragraph
3(a)(4)(B)(i)(V), which exempts bank employee performing "only
clerical or ministerial functions in connection with brokerage
transactions" and paragraph 3(a)(4)(B)(i)(VI), which exempts
bank employee activities where:
... bank employees do not receive incentive com-
pensation for any brokerage transaction unless such
employees are associated persons of a broker or
dealer and are qualified pursuant to the rules of a
self-regulatory organization, except that bank employ-
ees may receive compensation for the referral of any cus-
tomer if the compensation is a nominal one-time cash fee
of a fixed dollar amount and the payment of the fee is not
contingent on whether the referral results in a transac-
tion."'15
It will be noted that this language is substantially similar
to the language of the Interagency Statement; however, it is not
exactly the same. The statutory language of Gramm-Leach-Bliley
refers to a "cash" fee, which language could be implied to require
a direct nexus between the referral and the compensation. In ad-
dition, there are differences in literal language between NASD
Rule 2350 and comparable provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
Each of these new provisions will be interpreted and enforced by
the SEC and self-regulatory organizations (in particular, the
NASD), a new development in the case of referral compensation.
With regard to the sale of insurance, Gramm-Leach-Bliley
13. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 201, 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338,1385.
14. See id.
15. See id (emphasis added).
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expressly reserves to the states regulation of the business of in-
surance, subject to the certain non-discrimination requirements. 16
Section 104(d)(2)(B) of the statute expressly reserves state powers
with regard to restrictions on the sale of insurance. Of particular
interest to a discussion of cross-selling are clauses 104(d)(2)(B)(iv)
and (v). Clause 104(d) (2) (B) (iv) authorizes:
Restrictions prohibiting the payment or receipt of
any commission or brokerage fee or other valuable
consideration for services as an insurance agent or
broker ... to or by any person unless such person
holds a valid State license ... except that, in this
clause, the term "services as an insurance agent or
broker" does not include a referral by an unlicensed
person of a customer or potential customer to a li-
censed insurance agent or broker that does not in-
clude a discussion of specific insurance policy terms
and conditions.17
Clause 104(d)(2)(B)(v) authorizes restrictions,
"[p]rohibiting any compensation paid to or received by any indi-
vidual who is not licensed to sell insurance, for the referral of a
customer ... to a person that sells or provides opinions or advice
on such product, based on the purchase of insurance by the cus-
tomer." '8
Given the active participation of insurance industry repre-
sentatives in the negotiation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, it is no sur-
prise that the provisions regarding insurance referrals are
substantially similar to prior law. The similarities of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley provisions applicable to securities and insurance
referrals to the restrictions in effect prior to the legislation could,
and should, allow continuation of the referral compensation sys-
tems for bank employees of the kind discussed above. My con-
16. See § 104.
17. See § 104(d)(2)(B)(iv).
18. See § 104(d)(2)(B)(v).
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cern regarding the new law is that it creates opportunities for
administrative interpretation that could lead to another and less
happy outcome. An overly restrictive interpretation of laws re-
garding referrals and enforcement activities based on that inter-
pretation can, in the worst of the imaginable horrors, shut down
the referral process by essentially requiring that all bank person-
nel associated with the sale of securities and insurance products,
including customer service generalists, have to be licensed to sell
such products. Given the size, educational level and turnover of
bank sales forces, such regulatory activity would be prohibitively
expensive for all but the largest organizations (if even they could
afford it). As a result, the referral process, and the perceived
benefits to consumers of competition in the financial services
marketplace resulting from it, would be substantially reduced.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Conference Re-
port on Gramm-Leach-Bliley expresses a clear intention to sup-
port continued "networking" arrangements between banks and
brokers, including affiliated brokers. Prior to the adoption of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the NASD had adopted amendments to
Rule 1060, dealing with persons exempt from registration. Al-
though the amendment was originally intended to deal with the
perceived abuses of "cold calling," it included provisions that se-
verely limited the permissible conduct of persons who are not
registered, including bank customer service generalists. The
Conference Report stated:
The Conferees provided for and exception for networking
arrangements between banks and brokers. Revisions to Rule
1060 recently approved by the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") are in conflict with this provision. As a con-
sequence, revisions to the rule should be made to exempt banks
and their employees from the provisions' coverage.19
The NASD Regulation staff is, as a result of this statement,
currently "evaluating methods to address this congressional re-
19. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Conference
Report in Respect of Gramm- Leach-Bliley, at 164.
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quest."20 The statement of the Conference Committee referred to
above shows a clear intention to cause Gramm-Leach-Bliley to be
implemented in a way that fosters competition by allowing the
conduct of securities sales by banks and their affiliates without
undue interference. I hope that this policy will be honored in the
interpretation of other statutory and administrative provisions
relating to referral compensation. This is not a quarrel with the
legal requirement of regulation of referrals or the need for inves-
tor protection. It is rather an expression of hope that the regula-
tory process will be modulated in a way that allows incentive
programs that encourage unlicensed employees to do the right
thing continue, without undue restriction as to form or content.
C. Privacy
Gramm-Leach-Bliley contains provisions regarding pri-
vacy of customer financial information that were both path-
breaking and heavily debated.21 These provisions are a major
topic by themselves, but a comment about their relationship to
the retail financial services model discussed above are in order.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions do not appear to be unduly
restrictive from the point of view of this model, as information
sharing by a financial institution, its affiliates and certain third
parties is permitted, subject to disclosure and the ability of cus-
tomers to "opt out" of information sharing with third parties.22
Satisfaction with the privacy provisions is subject to three mate-
rial caveats: (i) the provisions are to be fleshed out by administra-
tive rulemaking; (ii) the proponents of more restrictive privacy
regulation have made it clear that they will raise the issue again
in the next session of Congress; and (iii) Gramm-Leach-Bliley
preserves substantial rights in the states to adopt more restrictive
20. NASD Memorandum to District Committees, regarding Financial Mod-
ernization Ganuary 20,2000).
21. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501-527, 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338,1436-1450.
22. See §§ 502-503.
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privacy protections.23 I don't know of anyone who is interested
in the privacy issue who thinks that the debate over customers'
financial privacy is over.
Privacy is a major issue with competitors in the financial
services marketplace. As is the case with referral compensation,
increased legal restrictions on the collection and use of customer
information can substantially reduce the effectiveness of the de-
livery of retail financial services by banks. Imposing restrictions
on the sharing of information among corporate affiliates will, at
best, increase the cost of using information gathering technology
and know-how that many industry participants have spent sig-
nificant amounts to develop. Opt in requirements will make it
expensive and cumbersome to obtain and use such information.
From the point of view of financial institutions the imposition of
additional costs at the margin reduces their effectiveness in un-
derstanding consumer needs and customizing the offering and
delivery of products and services to customers. The use of cus-
tomer information will increase competition in the financial ser-
vices marketplace and should increase consumer welfare as a
result. It bears repeating: increasing competition is the policy
goal of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
All of the foregoing having been said, the privacy issue is
going to be with us in financial services for the foreseeable future.
Public concern with the issue is growing, assisted by recent and
unfortunate charges that major financial institutions have sold
customer information without customer consent. Further, pri-
vacy is an issue that affects our foreign trade, given the much
more restrictive requirements of the European Union, which are
being used as a barrier to entry by US firms. We in the industry
can and should fight the good fight to prevent further restrictions
on access to and use of customer financial information from be-
ing enacted; however, we should also think about how to make
such use more accepted by customers, legislators and regulators.
In dealing with this issue, I think we should pay attention to re-
search on the topic of customer information use that suggests
23. See§524.
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that a source of customer dissatisfaction is the belief that a cus-
tomer's personal information has been appropriated by business
firms without providing the customer with anything of value in
return.24 In that regard, financial institutions might consider de-
velopment of inducements to customers to share information
similar in concept to the affiliation programs of airlines and car
rental companies or the "free" subscription offered by the online
New York Times in exchange for certain personal information of
the subscriber. Approaches like these, tailored to the context of
financial services, may be a helpful augmentation to technical ar-
guments against further regulation.
D. Community Reinvestment Act
After a lively legislative debate, the Community Rein-
vestment Act ("CRA") will live on into the new millennium, sub-
ject to a few "sunshine" provisions that should not present much
of a challenge to its continuing vitality.25 In fact, Gramm-Leach-
Bliley extends the reach of CRA by incorporating its require-
ments into approval of the new activities of financial holding
companies, whether de novo or through mergers or acquisitions. 26
To our friends in the insurance and securities industries who are
entering the "business of banking," we in the "traditional" bank-
ing industry welcome you to the world of the CRA. Although
the CRA technically deals with meeting the credit needs of the
communities served by banks, the insurance sales activities of
banks like Centura make such activities a likely subject of discus-
sion with community activist groups in the future. For example,
in connection with a recent acquisition by Centura, the matters
discussed with a group of community activists included a pro-
posal that Centura adopt a series of "Principles for Responsible
Property Insurance Providers." These principles attempt to apply
24. See, e.g., John Hagel HI & Jeffrey F. Rayport, The Coming Battle for Customer
Information, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.- Feb. 1997, at 53.
25. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-012, §§ 711-715,1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338,1465-1470.
26. See § 1020)(2).
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a number of CRA / HMDA concepts to the underwriting and de-
livery of insurance. While we did not adopt the proposed prin-
ciples, it is clear that our ongoing dialogue with community
groups in the future will involve insurance along with lending
and other more traditional CRA topics. As more banks enter the
insurance business, I believe they will have to deal with this issue
as well.
It is interesting to note in this regard that an example of
community reinvestment undertakings in the context of a cross-
industry merger is already in existence. In connection with the
Citicorp / Travelers transaction forming Citigroup, both Citicorp
and Travelers made significant CRA undertakings. In addition to
a $115 billion commitment to lending in low and moderate in-
come communities and to small businesses, Citigroup also an-
nounced substantial insurance commitments, as follows:
In a first effort by a bank to enhance its community
program by integrating the products, services and
community programs of a non-depository institu-
tion, Citigroup also announced that it voluntarily
will expand the availability of commercial and
homeowners insurance coverage and provide spe-
cial pricing to low and moderate income customers.
Travelers Group, which generally is not subject to
CRA requirements, has pledged that the non-bank
businesses it is contributing to the new Citigroup
will actively support a broad range of community
development activities as a reflection of its com-
mitment to good corporate citizenship.27
The release goes on to outline a number of additional
commitments, including undertakings as to community invest-
ments, charitable contributions and workplace diversity.
27. CTIcoRP, PRESS RELEASE (May 4, 1998). See also Steven E. Frank, Citicorp
and Travelers Commit $ 115 Billion to Community Loans, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1998, at
B4.
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I believe that the Citigroup undertakings are, in concept if
not in scale, the wave of the future in CRA. Like privacy, the is-
sues of fairness and access to capital that underlie CRA will re-
main with us, particularly as the financial services industry
continues to consolidate. As banks, securities firms, and insurers
work together, whether through mergers and acquisitions, alli-
ances or distribution agreements, dealing with the issues of eq-
uity addressed by CRA will be a part of what we do. In my view,
the best thing we can do is to treat outreach to alleged under-
served communities as a business opportunity, rather than a
regulatory burden.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS AND AN ATrEMPT AT SUMMING UP
This article is not and is not intended to be comprehensive
of all of the issues arising from Gramm-Leach-Bliley or disposi-
tive of the issues it deals with. It is intended to highlight a few
issues that will confront traditional banks and new entrants into
the "business of banking" as we compete in a new and signifi-
cantly altered regulatory environment. Although some of the is-
sues discussed above are particular to banks, I believe most will
apply to all competitors in one way or another as each of us at-
tempts to grow in the years to come. Let us hope that the new
competitive environment arising from Gramm-Leach-Bliley re-
sults in the benefits envisioned by its proponents both for con-
sumers and for the industry itself. Onward and, let us hope,
upward.
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